[1] Introduction: From Political to Economic Authoritarianism
[1.1] Authoritarianism as the Absence of Limits to Power (Locke)
John Locke (1632–1704), in his Second Treatise of Government (see Locke, 1690), emphatically asserted the principle that no power can be absolute or unconditional. Central to Locke’s political philosophy is the imperative that power must always be bounded and subject to constraints (Maldonado-Veloza, 1988). This normative framework laid the groundwork for modern notions of political legitimacy and governance.
Subsequently, Montesquieu (1689–1755) elaborated on these foundational concepts in his 1748 treatise, formulating the systematic doctrine of the separation of powers as an essential mechanism to prevent the concentration of authority.
Presently, however, the practical functioning of American democracy is confronted with unprecedented challenges. Since the commencement of Donald Trump’s second administration, the political environment has undergone a fundamental transformation, increasingly veering toward an expansive and unchecked authoritarianism.
Established institutional limits on power have been rescinded or weakened, and episodes of power abuse have become more frequent.
Conversely, the economic counterpart to the political construct of authoritarianism can be identified as unilateralism. Unilateralism, in turn, gives rise to a form of economic authoritarianism exemplified by Trump’s policies. Consequently, it becomes imperative to analyze the disruptive implications of such protectionist proposals.
Metaphorically, the decisions and actions of his administration have manifested as spontaneous and capricious “hose-gun” displays.
These emanate from the core of authoritarianism and are directed indiscriminately toward friends, allies, and adversaries alike, reflecting a universal application. Comparable to an authoritarian ruler who employs jets and sprinklers to disseminate threats and assert dominance, this approach inundates all recipients equally. Consequently, all are subjected to this indiscriminate outpouring, highlighting the inherent nature of such authoritarian projection.
This universality is intrinsic to the nature of authoritarian dissemination.
To adequately comprehend this intensification of authoritarian tendencies, it is essential to investigate its intellectual genesis, particularly focusing on its economic dimensions and ideological underpinnings.
The promises articulated in Trump’s 2024 presidential campaign were explicit and transparent; thus, it is untenable to argue that the electorate was deceived. Indeed, these promises facilitated his electoral success. Although Trump’s authoritarian proclivities were widely acknowledged before his reelection, the breadth and intensity of authoritarian practices during his second term astonished many observers. Few anticipated the extent to which American democracy would experience such significant deterioration.
This regression underscores the vulnerability of even robust and historically resilient democracies to internal crises and autocratic distortions. The United States has entered into a phase wherein its democratic institutions are imperiled from within.
What began as electoral promises evolved into harbingers of democratic decline and ultimately materialized as concrete authoritarian measures. A notable example of this progression is the presidential pardon granted on January 20, 2025, which extended clemency to approximately 1,500 individuals implicated in the Capitol insurrection of January 6, 2021. While emblematic of a breakdown in democratic norms, this act constituted only a partial fulfillment of the administration’s authoritarian agenda.
By September 2025, scholarly consensus increasingly regards the Trump administration as an exemplar of authoritarian governance, notable for its deleterious effects in eroding democratic structures and suppressing opposition.
The citizenry remains largely powerless as this emergent form of modern Caesarism solidifies, posing a substantive threat to the democratic fabric of the nation.
[1.2] A Measure of Authoritarianism (Bright Line Watch)
One established method for quantifying authoritarian tendencies is provided by the University of Chicago’s Bright Line Watch initiative, which has been monitoring democratic performance since 2017. The center’s most recent survey, conducted in April 2025, compiled responses from 760 political scientists (“experts”) and a representative sample of 2,000 American citizens (“the public”).
The findings reveal a marked deterioration in the quality of democracy within the United States. Using a scale ranging from 0 (least democratic) to 100 (most democratic), the index dropped precipitously to 55 points, down from 59 in February of the same year.
According to the survey data, the Trump administration has systematically violated constitutional and democratic norms across multiple domains, including:
[1] The scope and limits of executive power;
[2] the judiciary’s authority to constrain the executive;
[3] protections for freedom of expression;
[4] employment of due process;
[5] respect for habeas corpus;
[6] immigration policies;
[7] academic freedom (Bright Line Watch, 2025, p. 1).
The administration’s trajectory has already generated significant domestic discontent, generating animosities and mounting opposition not only within the United States but also throughout the broader region and internationally. This authoritarian impulse is exerting profound effects on societies in Latin America and is prompting critical reconsiderations regarding the concept and viability of democracy itself. Moreover, these dynamics intersect with the strategic competition involving China on the global stage.
[1.3] “Competitive Authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way)
The political developments and behaviors witnessed under this administration have been subject to rigorous analysis within political science. Levitsky and Way (2010) articulated the concept of “competitive authoritarianism” to explain such phenomena.
According to their framework, when an elected leader incrementally undermines the checks and balances constraining executive authority, engages in clientelism by populating key administrative positions with loyalists, assaults the independence of the press—including both proprietors and journalists—harasses academic and scientific institutions, and persecutes civil society organizations, a regime emerges that blends formally democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. So, we’re talking about Competitive authoritarianism (competitive authoritarianism).
Critics routinely face severe reprisals.
A salient illustration of these abuses involves the legal profession, with prominent law firms such as Perkins Coie, WilmerHale, and Jenner & Block subjected to intimidation and attacks for opposing and legally challenging executive orders issued during the Trump administration.
Certain commentators have situated these practices within the broader context of authoritarian and fascist tendencies. For example, Ruth Ben-Ghiat, a scholar at New York University, in her book Strongmen: Mussolini to the Present (2020), observes that “a nation that never endured a dictatorship or a foreign occupation now has first-hand experience of the authoritarian playbook” (2020, p. 255).
Bender and Gold, writing in The New York Times, echo this view, noting that Trump’s administration exhibits “echoes of fascist rhetoric,” particularly in its strategy to dehumanize people, “so that the public will not have as much of an outcry at the things that you want to do” (Ben-Ghiat, cited in Bender & Gold, 2023).
The concept of competitive authoritarianism has increasingly been applied in comparative political analysis to regimes as diverse as those led by Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Narendra Modi in India, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, as well as Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
In their influential work How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) unequivocally characterize the Trump administration as “the least prodemocratic of any U.S. administration since Nixon’s” (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 206). They further contend that the United States “is no longer a democratic model”.
The authors warn that the Trump administration’s actions threaten not only domestic democratic governance but also contribute to a “global democratic recession” by emboldening authoritarian actors worldwide. They argue:
A country whose president attacks the press, threatens to jail up his rival, and declares that he might not accept election results cannot credibly defend democracy. Both existing and potential autocrats are likely emboldened with Trump in the White House. So even if the idea of a global democratic recession was largely a myth before 2016, the Trump presidency—together with the crisis of the EU, the rise of China, and the growing aggressiveness of Russia—could help make it a reality (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018, p. 206).
Additional markers of authoritarianism include increased self-censorship, the intensification of nationalist rhetoric, populist denunciations, and a pronounced arrogance within leadership.
For instance, investigative journalist Bob Woodward reported that in January 2018, Trump expelled Gary Cohn, then Director of the National Economic Council, due to his opposition to tariffs on steel and aluminum imports.
Cohn, former president of Goldman Sachs, was derided by Trump as a “globalist” for warning that tariffs effectively function as taxes on consumers. Trump reportedly told Cohn, “I don’t care what you think anymore, Gary” (Itkowitz, 2025).
The journalist, Colby Itkowitz, reacted to the scoop and commented that unfortunately, it seems that in 2025 there are no more people like Cohen left in his cabinet.
Ruth Ben-Ghiat encapsulates this dynamic, quoting Congressman Adam Schiff’s observation that the president’s approach demands that “Governors basically pay fealty to him, praise him, or they’ll suffer consequences” (2020, p. 256).
From an economic perspective, authoritarianism manifests not only politically but also through unilateralism—the economic counterpart to political authoritarianism. This twin phenomenon underscores that authoritarian governance extends its reach into economic policy and practice.
Mature democratic systems, however, retain institutional resources and societal resilience to resist such encroachments.
[1.4] Some Limits to Power as Resources of Democracy
[1.4.1] The Judgment of the International Court of Trade in Relation to the Tariffs Imposed on “Liberation Day”
On the day of his inauguration, January 20, 2025, President Trump declared several states of emergency. Notably, Executive Order 14157 invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), asserting that it granted him broad authority to act. Additionally, Proclamation 10886 declared a national emergency at the southern border of the United States, citing threats posed by drug cartels and criminal organizations. Since that time, governance under the Trump administration has predominantly proceeded through such executive orders.
On April 2, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14257, imposing “reciprocal tariffs” commencing at a 10 percent ad valorem rate on imports from nearly all countries. The administration relied on IEEPA as the legal authority for this sweeping trade action. However, this reliance was subsequently deemed erroneous by judicial review.
On May 28, 2025, the United States Court of International Trade ruled that the IEEPA did not grant the President the authority to impose broad tariffs in this manner.
Although an appeal temporarily stayed the order for three months, the Court’s reasoning decisively characterized the tariff impositions as abuses of power, unlawful, and unjustified under any legitimate emergency.
The ruling, articulated in a comprehensive 49-page opinion, stands as a significant exemplar of constitutional adjudication and political theory (United States Court of International Trade, 2025). The judicial intervention necessitated numerous pauses, reversals, modifications, and adjustments to the administration’s sweeping trade policy decisions, which had neglected to consider the full consequences of universally applied measures.
The tariffs were defended by the administration as responses to a purported emergency, premised on the claim that the trade deficit constituted an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States,” attributed largely to foreign economic policies and systemic imbalances within global trade (United States Court of International Trade, 2025, p. 14). The Court, however, cited prior precedent unequivocally:
[t]he declaration of a national emergency is not a talisman enabling the President to rewrite the tariff schedules (emphasis supplied, United States Court of International Trade, 2025, p. 29).
Further, the Court emphasized that the imposition of global and retaliatory tariffs is a matter “falling under the narrower, non-emergency authorities” granted by the statute (United States Court of International Trade, 2025, p. 34).
The ruling concluded:
The President’s assertion to tariff-making authority in the instant case, unbounded as it is by any limitation in duration or scope, exceeds any tariff authority delegated to the President under the IEEPA. The Worldwide and Retaliatory tariffs are thus ultra vires and contrary to law (United States Court of International Trade, 2025, p. 36).
The verdict stated definitively:
The court holds for the foregoing reasons that IEEPA does not authorize any of the Worldwide, Retaliatory, or Trafficking Tariff Orders. The Worldwide and Retaliatory Tariff Orders exceed any authority granted to the President by IEEPA to regulate importation by means of tariffs. The Trafficking Tariffs fail because they do not deal with the threats set forth in those orders (United States Court of International Trade, 2025, p. 36).
This judgment exemplifies the vital role of constitutional limits and the separation of powers as essential safeguards against the overreach of executive authority.
[1.4.2] The Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Relation to the Judgment of the International Court of Trade
On the same day as the ruling, the Trump administration appealed the International Trade Court’s decision, which had overturned the five executive orders that imposed “unlimited tariffs on nearly all goods from nearly every country in the world.”
On August 29, 2025, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, concurring that “that IEEPA’s grant of presidential authority to “regulate” imports does not authorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders” (emphasis supplied, 2025, p. 5).
Referencing established legal precedents, the Court underscored that the President “is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue” (emphasis supplied, 2025, p. 38). The Court further elaborated:
we conclude Congress, in enacting IEEPA, did not give the President wide-ranging authority to impose tariffs of the nature of the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs simply by the use of the term “regulate . . . importation” (p. 38).
The final determination reaffirmed:
We affirm the CIT’s holding that the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA’s text (emphasis supplied, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 2025, p. 45).
While the Supreme Court’s review remains pending, these judicial decisions illustrate that even in the face of authoritarian tendencies, democratic institutions retain mechanisms to check and limit executive power.
[1.4.3] The Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in Relation to Academia and Free Speech
Another arena wherein limits on executive power were tested is the realm of higher education. President Trump publicly accused several American universities of violating the civil rights of Jewish and Israeli students, threatening to withhold federal research funding on the grounds that pro-Palestinian protests on campuses amounted to discriminatory behavior.
In response, Harvard University filed suit against the government on April 21, 2025, challenging these threats as violations of the First Amendment and deeming them arbitrary and capricious.
On September 3, 2025, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled decisively in favor of Harvard (United States District Court District of Massachusetts, 2025). The court reaffirmed the fundamental importance of the First Amendment, emphasizing that free speech “must be jealously protected” as a cornerstone of American democracy:
The Supreme Court itself has recognized that efforts to educate people, change minds, and foster tolerance all benefit from more open communication, not less (emphasis supplied, United States District Court District of Massachusetts, 2025, p. 80).
Citing longstanding jurisprudence dating to 1927, the court referenced Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California:
As Justice Brandeis wrote in the seminal case of Whitney v. California, “[i]f there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence,” 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied, United States District Court District of Massachusetts, 2025, p. 80)
While acknowledging the legitimacy of combating anti-Semitism, the court identified a critical distinction:
Defendants and the President are right to combat antisemitism and to use all lawful means to do so. Harvard was wrong to tolerate hateful behavior for as long as it did (p. 81).
Fighting anti-Semitism cannot be achieved on the basis of the First Amendment:
The record here, however, does not reflect that fighting antisemitism was Defendants’ true aim in acting against Harvard and, even if it were, combatting antisemitism cannot be accomplished on the back of the First Amendment (p. 81).
The court thus called for a careful balancing of interests:
We must fight against antisemitism, but we equally need to protect our rights, including our right to free speech, and neither goal should nor needs to be sacrificed on the altar of the other (p. 81).
The ruling criticized Harvard for previously delayed responses to anti-Semitic incidents but recognized the institution’s willingness to take further action if necessary.
Lastly, the court underscored the judiciary’s role going forward: Courts must take initiatives “in a similar manner” to safeguard academic freedom and freedom of expression as mandated by the Constitution and “ensure that important investigations are not unduly subjected to arbitrary and procedurally deficient subsidy terminations” (p. 81).
The court also issued a cautionary note:
Now it is the job of the courts to similarly step up, to act to safeguard academic freedom and freedom of speech as required by the Constitution, and to ensure that important research is not improperly subjected to arbitrary and procedurally infirm grant terminations, even if doing so risks the wrath of a government committed to its agenda no matter the cost (emphasis supplied, p. 81).
This case exemplifies democracy’s capacity to defend itself through institutional resilience. Harvard University’s successful defense of intellectual autonomy, resisting government coercion, affirms the enduring strength of constitutional safeguards.
As we will soon observe below, economic authoritarianism in the form of unilateral tariff policies officially commenced on April 2, 2025. Tracing the ideological origins of these decisions reveals Miran’s (2024) article to be an indispensable resource for understanding the constellation of trade measures and their economic underpinnings.
It is reasonable to anticipate that the tensions between governmental branches during the remainder of the Trump administration will persist unabated.